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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTH KOREAN WAR EFFORT

Tab 1 - The Degree, Nature, and Estimated Effectiveness of Soviet Participation in the North Korean War Effort.

Tab 2 - The Degree, Nature, and Estimated effectiveness of Chinese Communist Participation in the North Korean War Effort.

Tab 3 - G-2/ FEC Psychological Warfare (Propaganda) Program in Korean Conflict.

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THE DEGREE, NATURE, AND ESTIMATED EFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTH KOREAN WAR EFFORT

I. THE PERIOD AUGUST 1945 to DECEMBER 1948

At the time of the Japanese surrender, in August 1945, a state of chaos existed.(*) Groups formed, under Russian direction, to organize four provincial governments. Initially, popular leaders were selected, (1) but later on dependable Communists replaced non-Communists(2)(3.)

During the occupation, the USSR contributed little to the Korean economy; rather, they stripped North Korea of both raw and finished materials, food stuffs, and machine tools(4); later, this stripping ceased(5), and an effort was made to re-educate the North Koreans along the lines of the Soviet economic system. Soviet advisors visted Korea, while selected Koreans were trained in Soviet factories and schools.

Political indoctrination was started as soon as reliable Communists had been maneuvered into key government positions. Schools for the indoctrination of the masses were initiated(6), and a controlled press and radio appeared. At the same time, unreliable school teachers were replaced. Every opportunity was utilized to create hatred and distrust for the western powers. This indoctrination has continued in all fields. It is carried on in trade schools, during military training, in factories, and at every other chance. The politically naive Koreans have been a fertile field for Communist indoctrination.

Militarily, the USSR has been of great assistance. Initially, this assistance reportedly took the form of organizing, equiping and training

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* This study is divided into three parts, into chronological periods characterized by different forms and degrees of Soviet-North Korean relationships; these periods are (1) Post World War II Soviet occupation of North Korea; (2) The period subsequent to the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from North Korea and (3) Subsequent to the North Korean invasion and up to the present time; documentary references for the statements made in the body of the study are included as a bibliography.

a police force, and the establishment of military schools(7). Reportedly Korean veterans returned from the Chinese Communists Army. Eventually, Soviet advisors could be found at every level from the highest level to the front line battalion. Again, as part of the training, a hatred of western powers and the idea; "Asia for the Asiatics" and a "United Korea" were insidiously instilled.

During the occupation period, North Korea was politically and militarily organized so that by December 1948, Soviet troops could be withdrawn in complete confidence that North Korea was entirely Soviet dominated. Economically the Russians have not been so successful due to the necessity of maintaining North Korea on a war footing, and due to a lack of industrial "know-how".

II. THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 1948 to 24 JUNE 1950

Although a Soviet withdrawal of tactical troops was completed in December 1948, the Soviet Union retained complete control of North Korea by means of a large diplomatic mission (estimated personnel - 700) and approximately 4000 Soviet military and civilian advisors superimposed over all phases of North Korean life(8). Control of the North Korean Government was a function of the Soviet Mission at Pyongyang headed by Ambassador T. F. Shtikov who reported to Moscow(9). The Soviet Diplomatic Mission consisted of the Ambassador's immediate staff and six bureaus (Military Affairs, Censorship and Public Information, Forestry and Agriculture, Culture, Transportation and Industry) paralleling similar functions in the organization of the North Korean Government(10). Physical control of the government was performed by Soviet "advisors" working with North Korean top officials and, when required, by Ambassador Shtikov directly with Premier Kim Il Sung(11). Economic control was not relinquished by the Soviets at the time of their so called withdrawal from North Korea; Soviet advisors and technicians continued to implement economic control of strategic industry at the factory level(12). Military control was exercised through the attachment of Soviet advisors to the

Ministry of Defense and down to divisions and certain subordinate units (13). Following the withdrawal the political orientation of the North Korean Government remained constant with absolute adherence to the Communist line evidenced in all transactions. Communist political indoctrination of the populace also continued without interruption with a noticeable increase in anti-U.S. propaganda apparent(14). A decided increase in Soviet military aid became evident in 1949 with further acceleration in the flow of USSR military equipment in 1950(15). Pacts concluded during the period between the Soviet Union and North Korea, though generally favorable to the Soviets and obviously designed to bind the destiny of North Korea to the Communist cause, provided military, monetary and economic aid to North Korea(16).

III. THE PERIOD 25 JUNE 1950 TO THE PRESENT

On 25 June 1950 the North Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the Republic of Korea. Six reinforced divisions were employed in this initial assault. An average of fifteen Soviet officers per division had acted as technical and tactical advisors during the training of these divisions in North Korea. After 25 June, most of the committed divisions had 3 or 4 Soviet advisors. Each division was equipped primarily with Soviet manufactured armaments, normally including 18-122 mm howitzers, 18-76 mm howitzers, 18-120 mm mortars, 81-82 mm mortars, 54-45 mm anti-tank guns, and 162-7.62 mm heavy machine-guns. In addition, there were large quantities of Soviet and Japanese made small arms. At least ten of the senior commanders within these divisions had received training in the Soviet army; some of them had been officers in the Soviet army.

Reinforcing these divisions were elements of a Soviet trained and equipped tank brigade. Best estimates of the size of the tank brigade indicate that it was equipped with at least 150 Soviet T34/85 tanks, plus approximately an equal number of SU-76 self-propelled assault guns, and

an undetermined number of BA-64 armored cars. Soviet advisors to the tank brigade reportedly numbered 7.

On 25 June, the North Korean People's Air Force reportedly consisted of approximately 150 fighter and ground-attack aircraft. Of this total, 75 were Soviet made YAK 7B, or YAK 11, and 75 were Soviet made Il-10 ground-attack aircraft. The pilots were trained under the supervision of the Soviet air advisors, of which 18 are reported to have been attached to the North Korean People's Air Force.

The North Korean People's Navy has been trained, partially equipped, and supervised by the USSR. The Commander-in-Chief of the NK Navy, a Vice-Admiral, and the Commander of the Wonsan Naval Base, a Rear Admiral, both received training in the USSR. Soviet Naval advisors consisted of ten naval officers and sixteen seamen. Specific Soviet-made vessels included an 800 ton mine layer, a 400 ton coast guard gun boat, three 40 ton coast guard patrol boats, and five motor torpedo boats. The armament of these vessels, including electric torpedoes for the MTB's, are all Soviet manufactured.

Subsequent to the initial invasion, the abortive air and naval action has disclosed no appreciable build-up in strength from within or from outside North Korea -- although there have been a few reports indicating the presence of small numbers of Soviet type jet fighters and twin engine light bombers. In the ground war, however, recently implemented mobilization and reorganization have been disclosed by the arrival of additional divisions on the battle field.(*) Usually less well-trained and less fully equipped with heavy weapons, these units nevertheless disclose the pattern of Soviet military organization and material, tactical, and technical assistance. The shortage of transport and of fuel are reflected in the smaller quantities of tanks, artillery, and mortars available to these units; although in nearly every case, the

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* See report KLO No. 518, 25 March 1950, on the prewar organization of the North Korean Army. A copy of this report, clearly announcing strength and estimated month of the invasion, is attached hereto with the Table of Battle Order of the Korean Divs. as developed after the invasion, thru PW or other indications.

original source of existing North Korean equipment is clearly identified as the USSR.

The degree of participation of Soviet personnel as advisers to tactical units subsequent to the crossing of the 38th parallel has not been firmly established. In this connection, however, reliable reports indicate the establishment in the former US Embassy at Seoul of a senior military headquarters which includes 50 Soviet officers.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTRACTS ON SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA

ITEM	INCL NO
Intell Summary 2864, Order of Battle Notes: 3rd Rifle Division Korean Peoples' Army; North Korean Peoples' Navy	1.
Intell Summary 2853, Interrogation of North Korean Pilot	2.
Intell Summary 2882, ATIS Interrogation Report No. 219: Intelligence School; Order of Battle notes	3.
Intell Summary 2869, 2nd North Korean Division	4.
Intell Summary 2870, NKPA Military Academy at Sadong	5.
Intell Summary, 2874, NK Replacements and Reinforcements	6.
Intell Summary 2863, Soviet Naval Advisors in Wonsan	7.
Intell Summary 2866, Soviet Officers in Seoul	7.
Intell Summary 2877, Soviet Advisers in Hoeryong	7.
ATIS Interr Rpt 179, Soviet Officers in Changhowan	7.
FRU/FEC Reports, Order of Battle Notes	7.
Intell Summary 2873, Soviet Forces to receive North Korean and CCF Troops in Manchuria	7.
FRU/FEC Reports, Order of Battle Notes	7.
Intell Summary 2848, YAK-3 Aircraft Strafe Kimpo Airfield	8.
Intell Summary 2851, Soviet Built Aircraft and Soviet Advisers	8.
Intell Summary 2852, North Korean Air Force has Soviet-Built Aircraft and Soviet Advisers	8.
Intell Summary 2854, Soviet-Built Aircraft over Suwon	8.
Intell Summary 2856, Soviet-Built Ships and Aircraft in North Korean Hands	8.
Intell Summary 2861, Soviet-Type Armament in use by North Koreans	8.
ATIS Interr Rpt 185, Soviet-Built Tanks in use by North Koreans; Soviet Advisers with NK Forces	9.
Intell Summary 2884, Soviet Advisers with NK Divisions	9.
ATIS Interr Rpts 273, Soviet-Built Tanks and Soviet Advisers with 105th NK Regiment	10.
Intell Summary 2885, Soviet Advisers with NK Forces North of 38th Parallel	10.
Intell Summary 2875, CG of 8th NKPA Division Former Soviet Army Officer	10.
Intell Summary 2876, Soviet-Built Tanks used by NKPA	10.

ATIS Interr Rpt, NKPA Divisions have Soviet Advisers 10.

FRU/FEC Reports, Soviet Advisers with NKPA; NK Officers Former Soviet Officers 10.

G-2/FEC Reports, Soviets in Former U.S. Embassy, Seoul 10.

ATIS Interr Rpt 197, Soviet-Made Equipment used by NKPA 11.

Prewar Battle Order of the NK Army 11.

KMAG Liaison Report 518, Reported Amalgamation of CCF with People's Army and Rumor of 7th PA Division, NK, with G-2 Comment 11.

North Korean Army Order of Battle (as of 041600K, Aug 50), Chart No. 1 12.

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EXTRACTS ON SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA

Intell Summary 2864, 13 July 1950, p. 1e

(a) Order of Battle Notes:(a)... 3d Rifle Division, Korean Peoples Army:

Equipment: The equipment used initially appears to have been obsolete or obsolescent Soviet discards. However, recent reports indicate that modern Soviet arms have been supplied. Late model Soviet tanks as well as anti-tank rockets launchers and other items of Soviet ordnance have been reported with increasing regularity during the past few days. These last mentioned items are apparently attached, rather than being organic to the division.

Personalities: Div Comdr: Maj Gen LEE Yong Ho (Former Lieutenant in USSR Army). G/S: Senior Col CHANG Pyung San (Former EM in USSR Army). G/Arty: Senior Col PAK U Sub (Former Officer in USSR Army). CO 8th Regt: Col Jun Gong (Former 2d Lt in USSR Infantry).

There are 15 Soviet advisers with the division, of which one - a colonel - is adviser to the division commander, two-captains or majors - are attached to each rifle regiment, and the balance are attached to other elements of the division.

(b) North Korean peoples' Navy:

Early in 1949 the North Korean Coast Guard was redesignated as the North Korean Peoples' Navy (NKPN) (Refer to Intell. Summary 2373). Reports indicate that the Commander-in-Chief is Vice Admiral HAN Il Mu, a Vice Minister of National Defense and former Soviet Navy Captain; the Chief of Staff is Rear Admiral KIM Wun Mu.

... Forces of the NKPN have been trained, partially equipped, and supervised by representatives of the Soviet Navy, and, as a result, the NKPN follows very closely the organization of the Soviet Navy, ...

A PW, captured 2 Jul 50, has stated that the present senior Soviet Naval adviser to the NKPN is a Captain Kapenzu (phonetic spelling).

... The NKPN possibly received a few obsolescent DEs (destroyer escort type vessels) from the USSR but probably no larger craft to date, although one report in Nov 49 stated that the Soviets in accordance with a mutual aid treaty with North Korea, signed 23 Feb 49, agreed to furnish the NKPN with "1w light cruisers, 9 warships, 11 destroyers, 30 submarines, 30 minesweepers and 190 motor torpedo boats" by May 52. Another single unconfirmed report stated that the NKPN in Feb 50 had 4 submarines; if true, their origin was undoubtedly the USSR. (Note: On 6 Jul 50 FEAF reported scoring hits on 4 submarine type vessels in Chinnampo harbor (Refer to Intell. Summary 2858).

It has been known for some time that the Soviets have been developing naval bases in North Korea in the vicinity of Unggi, Nagin, Chongjin and Wonsan. Soviet personnel have been supervising port activities, ship building and ship repair facilities in these and other less important ports. Shipbuilding equipment and Soviet technicians have been imported into North Korea. New projects at Wonsan, under the supervision of a team of 30 Soviet advisers, were reported to be 40 per cent completed on 22 Mar 50. It may be assumed that a high percentage of this harbor improvement and base construction was inaugerated with future naval operations in mind. The present Commanding Officer of the NKPN Naval base at Wonsan is Rear Admiral HONG Tong Chol, who was trained in the USSR.

Naval training programs are being carried out at several locations ... The submarine operation course is reported to be conducted for selected officers aboard Soviet submarines which remain in the training location for only a few days.

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EXTRACTS ON SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA

Intell Summary 2853, 2 July 1950

EXTRACTS ON SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA

3. Interrogation of North Korean Pilot:

The following aircraft statistics and locations were obtained 29 Jun from a North Korean pilot, a major, shot down in the vicinity of SUWON:

Name: [illegible], Tadato (Japanese)

Type	No.	LOCATION
YAK-7B	10	YONPO
YAK-11	12	YONPO
IL-10	18	YONPO
YAK-7B	10	SINMAK
IL-10	2	SINMAK
IL-10	7-8	PYONGYANG
YAK-7B	20	PYONGYANG
YAK-11	2	PYONGYANG
IL-10	40	PYONGYANG

(In wet weather these aircraft are moved to WONSAN)

The intelligence network resembles that used by [illegible] in that no lateral communication exists between units. It is so designed that individual agents do not know details of the whole network. This measure is taken to prevent jeopardizing the system in event individual

The pilot stated that a Soviet colonel had assumed command of the North Korean Air Force on 27 June and that 15 Soviets were serving as advisers. He knew of no Soviets being used as pilots.

[illegible] General Intelligence Information learned at [illegible] (Source: Capt. [illegible], POW Interrogator's Unit, January to March 1950)

1.) A Russian headquarters controlling an estimated 6 brigades, including one mechanized division, was established in TSITSIHAR in the first part of 1950, transferred later from HARBIN to SIPING. These units were under the command of a Lt. General (name unknown), who is considered one of the most outstanding figures in Russian Army circles. The advance echelon of this HQ was located in FUSHUN. These units are reported to have had extensive combat experience during World War II.

2.) In early 1950, high officials of RUSSIA and CHINA met in Peking and plans for NKPA were discussed there.

3.) About 100 tanks (medium and a few heavy) were given to the North Korean Army in early 1950, accompanied by about 30 Russian crew officers to train troops in tank warfare. Training commenced in January or February 1950. Quite a number of Koreans (nationality n/k) with Russian citizenship are assigned to North Korean armored units as unit subordinates.

4.) The Chinese Communist Army which has an overall strength of 3 million was prepared to furnish five to seven divisions to the North Korean Army, each division to be comprised of 20 to 22 thousand troops.

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EXTRACT OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA

Intell. Summary 2882, 31 July 1950
ATis Interrogation Report No. 219, 29 July 1950

Name: TANABE, Yoshio (Japanese)

a. Informant was an assistant instructor to Capt. OKAMOTO at an intelligence and espionage school at KATOTEN (36° 59' - 120° 34'), *** from March 1949 to December 1949.

On 31 June, Informant, KOBAYASHI, Genichi (alias), and 28 Koreans in his unit were assembled by Capt. OKAMOTO, Ken, CO of the unit, and introduced to a 1st Lt. HAN (fnu), a Chinese Communist Army Intelligence Officer. In the introduction Capt. OKAMOTO stated: "Lt HAN is one of the most outstanding intelligence officers of the Chinese Communist Army, having been trained in the military academy in Moscow for 3 years, and is a recent arrival from Russia. You men should consider it an honor to be able to serve under him. He speaks fluent Russian, Chinese, English, Korean, and Japanese. You are departing on a mission with Lt. HAN and I want you to follow his orders to the "T".

This intelligence network resembles that used by the Russians, in that no lateral communications exist between units. It is so designed that individual agents do not know details of the whole network. This measure is taken to prevent jeopardizing the system in event individual agents are captured and interrogated.

* * *

f. General Intelligence Information learned at HANKOW, CHINA. (Source: Capt. OKAMOTO, CO of Informant's Unit, January to March 1950)

1.) A Russian Headquarters controlling an estimated 8 brigades, including one mechanized division, was established in TSITSIHAR in the first part of 1950, transferred there from KHABAROVSK, SIBERIA. These units were under the command of a Lt. General (name unknown), who is considered one of the most outstanding figures in Russian Army circles. The advance echelon of this Hq was located in MUKDEN. These units are reputed to have had extensive combat experience during World War II.

2.) In early 1950, high officials of RUSSIA and CHINA met in Peking and plans for KOREA were discussed there.

4.) About 150 tanks (medium and a few heavy) were given to the North Korean Army in early 1950, accompanied by about 30 Russian armored officers to train troops in tank warfare. Training commenced in January or February 1950. Quite a number of Asiatics (nationality u/k) with Russian citizenship are assigned to North Korean armored units as unit commanders.

5.) The Chinese Communist Army which has an overall strength of 3 million was prepared to furnish five to seven divisions to the North Korean Army, each division to be comprised of 20 to 22 thousand troops.

EXTRACTS ON SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA

Intell. Summary 2869, 18 July 1950, p. 1-c

Second N. K. Rifle Div:

c. Equipment: Originally the division was equipped with obsolete or obsolescent Soviet weapons and probably some Japanese equipment. PW's have not mentioned new Soviet equipment or weapons as being issued. Artillery weapons are reported to be horse-drawn.

d. Personalities: The Division commander is Maj Gen LEE Chung Sung, age 40. He has an advisory staff of 15 Soviet officers headed by a colonel.

North Korean Tank Strength:

It is estimated that the tank strength of NK forces on 23 Jun totaled 260-315 tanks of all types. This was based on the positive identification of 5 NK infantry divisions and the probable identification of another division, each having a T/O strength of 52-65 T-34 medium tanks. As of 14 Jul Allied ground forces have reportedly observed a total of 231 tanks in the combat area. From an evaluation of EUSAK, ROK, and FEAF reports it is estimated that 108 tanks have been destroyed, leaving a remainder of 123 tanks in the combat area and an overall strength estimate of 152-204 NK tanks available for use against Allied forces.

Positive identification has been made of the T-34/85, a 35-ton tank armed with an 85mm gun. A few reports have been received claiming that 60-ton tanks equipped with 122 mm guns have been observed in the combat area. Until more definite information is obtained it is believed more likely that the larger gun observed is a 100 mm rather than 122 mm which would indicate the SU-100, a self-propelled artillery weapon mounted on the T-34 chassis. The SU-100 is organic to a Soviet division.

SECRET

EXTRACTS ON SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA

Intell. Summary 2870, 19 Jul 1950, p. 1-f

NKPA Military Academy at Sadong:

Interrogation of HWANG Soon Chul, 2d Lt North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA), and supply officer, 2d Battalion, 8th Regiment, 3d Division, who was captured by ROK forces 2 Jul produced the following information on the NKPA 1ist Military Academy at Sadong, five miles east of Pyongyang:

Officer candidate students are chosen from enlisted men having a minimum of six months service. Candidates, who must have a grammar school education and possess a satisfactory political background, are recommended by their company commanders. There are no other qualifications; rank of the enlisted men chosen does not matter.

Maj Gen CHO Yong Jin, age 38-39, born in Korean and trained in the USSR, became commandant of the NKPA Military Academy in 1948, after serving as CO 5th Regiment, 2d Division.

Staff members include Sr Col CHE Hak Il, age 40, 1st Deputy Commandant and Chief of the Political Culture Division, born in Korea and educated in the USSR; Sr Col CHUNG Hak Chung, age 38, 2d Deputy Commandant and concurrently Chief of the Artillery Division; Sr Col HONG Chol, age 37, 3d Deputy Commandant and concurrently Chief of the Supply Division.

Ther were three Soviet advisors, all Lt Cols, attached to the academy; one was assigned as an advisor to the commandant, one to the cultural section and one to the artillery department. The Soviet advisor with the cultural section died while the informant was still a student at the academy.

EXTRACTS ON SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO
NORTH KOREA

Intell Summary 2874, 23 July 1950, pp. 1e - 1f

NK Replacements and Reinforcements:

c. A source allegedly in contact with Chinese Communist elements in Peiping, reports additional evidence of the presence of NK army replacements or reinforcements in the Antung area, stating that "with the outbreak of the Korean War, Korean soldiers in the Chinese Communist Forces were demobilized and made to enter North Korea via Sinuiju (750-1950) with arms and ammunition under the leadership of Soviet officers. Twenty four thousand entered on 29 Jun and ten thousand on 2 Jul."

Another source claims that "Korean veterans of the Soviet Army who saw action in the Stalingrad area in World War II were demobilized and entered North Korea with arms, ammunition, motor cars, and trucks. Six thousand entered on 22 Jun and fifteen thousand on 3 Jul. In addition, 50,000 Korean soldiers in the USSR and 13,000 in China, including Manchuria, are being trained as soldiers of the Soviet Bloc."

Other recent reports of low evaluation claim that on 11 Jul Stalin sent a message to the North Korean leaders asking that NK troops hold the lines until 1 Aug by which time he would send Soviet forces into Manchuria to relieve 200,000 Chinese Communists and 50,000 Koreans for service in the Korean war. It is also reported that a rumor, now current in Seoul, is that the USSR has moved 6 Soviet divisions into Manchuria to augment the forces there.

d. G-2 Comment: The persistency with which the above unconfirmed rumors occur demand their consideration in future planning; it cannot be overlooked that the hand of International Communism is probably guiding the Korean venture and that the NK forces could be best and most quickly reinforced with battle-tested CCF forces routed over the Korean-Manchurian border. This move would have the added advantage, from the Communist point of view, of indicating no direct evidence of USSR support.

EXTRACTS ON SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA

Intell. Summary 2863, 11/12 Jul 50, p. 1c

Wonsan, hq. of the N. Korean Navy is scene of considerable Soviet activity. The Senior Soviet naval adviser has 10 officers, 16 men, who are conducting a 6-month course in Navigation Practice and Engineering. Training began in Aug 49 when the North Korean Navy was first organized.

Intell. Summary 2866, 15 Jul 50 , p. 1d

Unconfirmed report states that 50 Soviet officers arrived Seoul 6 Jul 50. Thirty were Soviet uniforms; the remainder, civilian clothes.

Intell Summary 2877, 26 Jul 50, p. 1f

Peoples Youth (Military) Training Center at Hoeryong N.K. has 3 Soviet advisers.

ATIS Interr. Report 179, 26 Jul 50.

PW states Soviet Maj. and 2 Lt. Cols last seen with 15th NK Div on 4 July 50 at Chunghoron Ni. All supplies came from USSR.

FRU/FEL 1283 ROK G-2 agent well trained (C-3)

15 July 20,000 Sov Koreans from Kazahistan & CCF Vets in training at Singosan (10/0-1800)

ZJY 1168 (Rept date 17 Jul 50) Chin Nat Off. (C-6) believed exaggerated.
Soviet forces in Manchuria - except Dairen & Port Arthur (where total 70,000).
100,000 Sov troops both banks Yalu river vicinity Antung 10,000 vehicles (Ref ZJY 1125)

ZJY 1165 (16 Jul 50) SKNP from refugees - Since 1945 Svs have reconstructed Tongyong Cave 12 mi west of Pyongyang (extends from Kujang to Ranin) Storage space for supplies & mil install.

ZJY 1164 (Rpt 15 Jul 50) US off. from Seoul merchant - San Soviets said to be pilots, tankers, heavy arty men in Seoul.

Soviet Planning and Control in Korea

Intell Summ 2873, 22 Jul 50, p. 1c (Source, ZJY 1221 from trained observed leaving Seoul 13 July 50)

On 11 Jul 50, Stalin sent message to NK Govt stating USSR would send forces into Manchuria to relieve 200,000 Chinese Communist troops and 50,000 Korean troops for service in the front lines. NK troops on the front were asked to hold until 1 Aug.

FRUFEC ZJY 1319 Chinat Off, G-2 Sources (C-6) Rpt 5 Aug 50

1. 8 Apr 50 Conference Vladivostok, Sov. CCF, MPR, Korean representatives for joint action for unification Korea:

a. 5 Sov. divs. & 230,000 Sov trained Japs incl. 70,000 parachute trained tps to be massed on Chin Sov border.

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EXTRACTS ON SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA

b. 2 CCF Divs of Manchuria & 3 Korean Comm. Divs & trained there & 1 Korean regt. formerly in CCF to be transferred to North Korea for combat operations.

2. ZJY 1297 Chin. Journalist from former member CCF organs. Peiping - arrived HONGKong July 50.

Moscow instructed Peiping not to relax war effort, as Chin. tps. may have to fight in Siberia, Korea, South East Asia, even Europe in case of World War.

3. ZJY 1221 (Rpt. 21 Jul 50) Korean civilian from trained observer - 11 July Stalin msg. to NK Govt USSR forces to Manchuria, relieve 200,000 CCF tps & 50,000 Sov. Korean tps. for front line service. Hold to 1 Aug.

Intell. Summ. 2883, 1 Aug 50, p. 1b.

105th Armd Tank Brig. organized May 49 at Sadong. Brigade used 20 Soviet T 34/85 tanks until Oct 49 when at least 150 additional T 34/85 s were supplied by the USSR.

SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN S. KOREA

Intell. Summary 2848, 27 Jun 50. Kimpo Area: On 26 Jun 50, 2 YAK-3's bombed and strafed Seoul airstrip; 4 YAK-3's strafed Seoul twice and dropped leaflets; and 4 YAK fighters strafed Kimpo Airfield.

Intell. Summary 2851, 30 Jun 50. On 29 Jun 50, Suwon Area. One LA-5 shot down 3 mi. North of Suwon, dull red star on right side fuselage. 4 YAKs bombed and strafed and 2 YAK-3's engaged US B-29.

Intell. Summary 2852, 1 Jul 50.

(a) N. Korea - 27 Soviet advisers reported with N. K. Air Force, headed by Colonel (Source?)
(b) Of N. Korean air force of 175 planes, 70 are believed to be YAK-type fighters, 70 are reported to be IL - 10 ground - attack aircraft. (These are all of Soviet manufacture).

Intell Summary 2854, 3 Jul 50. B-29 type bomber escorted by 2 LA-7's observed flying over Suwon. No markings. But this was Soviet aircraft.

Intell. Summary 2856, 5 Jul 50.

(a) N. Korean Navy at Wonsan (from PW rpt. of N.K. Naval Lt.)
1st Division - 1 ex-Soviet sub chaser
2nd Division - 5 UP, Soviet built
Vosper type PT boats.
(b) Though no overt Soviet participation has been observed in the Korean War to date, the fact that reports have been received that N. K. aircraft bearing Soviet insignia have been observed, leads to the possibility that the Soviets may be replacing NK aircraft lost in combat.
(c) NK Naval Lt. discloses that NK PT Boats carry 2 54.3 cm Soviet built electric torpedoes capable of 45 knots.

Intell. Summary 2861, 9/10 Jul 50, P. 1c

(a) N. Korean material:
Weapons captured by ROK forces include: Soviet Mossin Nagant rifles, Soviet Light Machine Guns and carriages, Soviet anti-tank guns, Soviet 76 mm. guns, Soviet 81 mm. mortars, Soviet AA machine guns, and arms for Soviet PPSH sub-machine guns.
(b) A report from the 6th ROK Div states that North Korean tanks captured by that division were identified by actual measurement of the tanks and by pictures from a Soviet material handbook as Soviet tanks, type T 34/85, and type JS-3.

EXTRACTS ON SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN SOUTH KOREA

ATIS Interr. Rpt 273, 31 Jul 50 (Field Rpt 174, 29 July 50)
PW of 105th Tank Regt. captured 27 July 50. Regt had one Soviet Lt. Col for adviser, and 40 Soviet T 34/85 tanks. Tank drivers were N. Koreans.

Intell Summary 2885, 3 Aug 50, p. 1-i.
Although PW's consistently recall Soviet advisers being with their units before crossing the 38th parallel, almost to a man they report they have not seen them since.

Intell. Summary 2875, 24 Jul 50, p. 1a, b.
8th Div NKPA CO is Maj. Gen. O Paek Yong, Sr. Lt. in Soviet Army, returned to N. Korea from USSR, 1945.

Intell. Summary 2876 25 Jul 50, p. 1f
Enemy armor destroyed by Air Force attacks was identified as Soviet T-34s mounting 85 or 76 mm guns.

ATIS Interr. Rpt. # 79, 24 Jul 50. (Field Rpt., G-2, 1st US Cav. Div #1, 18 Jul 50)
PW states each battalion has one Russian Lt. Col. as observer. NK 5th Inf division has two Russian Lt. Cols (as advisers).

ZJY 1181 (17 Jul 50)
Following Sov. citizens - (all Sr. Lts. in Soviet Army) are commanding NK Units Kim Ong, Lt. Gen (Sov Army Capt) CO of a task force in ROK.
Choe Kwang Maj. Gen. CO 1st NK Div.
Kim Kyung Sik , Maj Gen. Polit Commissar of 1st NK Div.
Kim Kwang Yup, CO 2nd NK Div.

FRUFEC ZJY 1314 NK officer PW rpt (B-6) Rpt 5 Aug 50.

28 Jun 50 saw 7 Sov advisers out of the 15 of the 3rd NK div in Soviet Uniform on road about 10 Miles North of Seoul. This is first such reference.

JSO/KLO Radio Rpt # 7, 29 Jul 50.
NKPA Seoul erected Supreme Mil. Comm. 1 Jul 50, Hq in former US Embassy includes 40 Soviet Army personnel, 20 Chin. Commy & 50 NKPA (C-6).

ZJY 1236 (Well-trained Korean Observer) Report 27 Jul 50.
NK occupied ROK cities and towns have polit. advisory groups of 5 Soviets & counter-espionage groups of 7 - 8 Soviets since early July.
Refugee from Puyo (991 - 1188) saw non Asiatic Soldiers in fatigues 22 Jul. Thought they spoke Russian. Believed them Soviet soldiers.

KLO Radio Rpt 1 23 Jul 50.
Sov Hq. in US Embassy Bldg., Seoul.

ATIS Interr. Rpt # 197, 27 Jul 50. (Field Rpt 104)
PW of 8th NK Div is the source. Stated there are no Russians in the 8th Div. Majority of men had Soviet M 1895/30 rifles. The Division also had 8 Soviet ZIS-5 trucks, 10 YAG-4 trucks and 2 GAZ-67 jeeps.

EXTRACTS ON SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN SOUTH KOREA

ATIS Interr. Rpt 185 26 July 50.

PW, a 2nd Lt. of 4th NK Div, captured 12 July said tanks in use by NK forces are T-34's. He had also observed some Soviet JS-3 tanks in Pyongyang at an earlier date. All tank drivers were North Koreans, but there are 6 or 7 Soviet advisers with the Mechanized Brigade.

Intell. Summary 2384, 2 Aug 50, p. 1f.

Most N. Korean divisions have 3 to 4 Soviet advisers.